A time series cross sectional analysis of 18 successful later entrants in 8 categories of consumer packaged goods over the period from October 1983 to January 1988 confirms previous empirical findings that after correcting for differences in marketing effort and product quality, later entrants suffer a long term market share disadvantage. New evidence of the penalties associated with later entry are found in statistical estimation of models of cumulative trial, first repeat, and subsequent repeat purchasing. Significantly lower asymptotic levels are found in both trial and repeat behavior. However based on this data, the rate of approach of later entrants to their lower asymptotic performance measures is either equal to or faster than early entrants and provides evidence of a compensating partial effect accrued by later entrants.
INTRODUCTION
This paper expands the empirical base of knowledge on the effects of order of entry in the frequently purchased consumer products industry. A cross sectional analysis of market shares in package goods by Urban et a (1986) found persistent share advantages for pioneers --later entrants had systematically lower long term market shares. The analysis reported here extends this previous study in three important ways. First, a cross sectional and time series data base is used to examine the dynamic effects of later entry. This allows one o address the question, do later entrants approach their asymptotic share at a slower or faster rate than pioneers? Second, this study examines the effects of order of entry on trial penetration and repeat purchases as well as share.
Third, the use of UPC scanner data allows analysis of price, promotion, and distribution effects which were not included in the original cross sectional analysis by Urban et al.
Many theoretical economic (e.g. Schmalensee 1982 ) and behavioral (e.g. Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989) explanations have been given for order of entry advantages. We will not establish the behavioral causes for pioneering advantage in this work, but we will provide empirical evidence on purchase dynamics which can aid in the construction of a theory of entry advantage and the design of behavioral experiments to test it. For a more complete literature review see Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) and Robinson (1988) .
In this paper we describe the structures for dynamic models for share, trial penetration, and repeat purchasing and then discuss their measurement and estimation. Next we present the empirical results and the implications of our study. We close with the identification of future research needs.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT Market Share
We model overall market share in each period by an underlying share growth pattern which is modified by order of entry, distribution, price, promotion, advertising, and product quality effects.
We posit that the underlying share will grow at a decreasing marginal rate to an asymptote. The growth is described by an exponential function which depends on the order of entry of the brand. All variables except order of entry are expressed as ratios to the first brand to enter the category. The formal equation is:
Sit = Ratio of share of ith brand to share of first brand to enter We have suppressed a category subscript for notational simplicity.
Underlying Share Growth:
The underlying market share for later entrants to enter a category relative to the pioneer is described by (1 -e-t). Figure 1 shows the typical underlying share pattern in a market as entry occurs. Initially the pioneer has OO percent of the market but los-es share as the second brand enters. We assume that the second brand's share grows at decreasing rate over time and approaches an asymptote. When the second brand enters, a discrete change takes place in the curve describing the pioneer because shares in the market must add to 100%. Similarly when the third brand enters, the share curves for the first and second entrants undergo a discrete change as the third entrant's share grows asymptotically. These curves are not smooth exponential functions, but if we assume that the third entrant takes share from brands one and two in a manner proportional to their shares, we obtain the desired smoothness in the share ratios of equation 1. This is the constant ratio model assumption of competitive interaction and it has the attractive property in our case that when we ratio the share of the i th brand to enter the market to the first entrant in the category, the curves of relative share versus time become
p: factor (E 4 ). This allows the asymptote to be lower for later entrants if a < 0 or higher if a > 0.
The effect of order of entry on the rate of growth in share is 1 If the share of i th entrant (i greater than 2) is S 'and S 1' and S'are the shares of the first and second entrants before entry of the i th brand, the ratio of the second to first entrant after entry is S 2 /S 1 = (S 2 '/(1 + Si))/(S1,'/( + Si)) = S2'/S1'. 2 Equation 1 has no constant (K) because we want to preserve for the case where only one brand is in the market the asymptotic property of the share ratio being 1. With only one brand all the independent ratios will be one and the share ratio will be one only if K is not included or its value is 1. share is obtained directly from the IRI weekly data reports and is ratioed to the first entrant to provide the dependent measure S in equation 1.
Order of entry (E) is not completely defined in the UPC data. For brands that entered in our 220 week span of UPC data, the order of entry of each brand was obtained by observing the week in which the brand first appeared in the UPC store data.
In cases where existing brands entered the market before the beginning of our data (October 31, 1983), we interviewed brand managers in the respective category and reviewed trade publications (Advertising Age and Marketing News) to determine order of earlier entrants.
Distribution in the IRI data is measured by the occurrence of some sales movement in a store over a week. The percent distribution is the proportion of the stores recording sales of the brand weighted by the volume of that store relative to the total market volume. This "all commodity weighted volume" measure is used as the distribution variable in the ratio D.
Suggested retail price is not reported directly in the UPC reports but can be derived from the weekly reported check out prices per unit volume (these include promotion effects) by considering the IRI measures of "deal volume percentage" (average percent of volume purchased on any deal) and "promotional price cut" (the average percentage of suggested price cut per unit volume of purchase).
The check out price is suggested price weighted by the deal volume percentage and promotional price cut: (5)
The dollar promotional expenditure is constructed from the deal volume percentage and promotional price cut variables. Despite this limitation, the data base is attractive because it measures not only share but also trial and repeat behavior, includes price, promotion, and distribution variables, and reports store level marketing activity on a weekly basis.
Estimation
The share, trial, and repeat models developed above are nonlinear time series cross sectional models from the estimation point of view. We linearize the basic terms of equations 1,2, and 3 by taking logs of both sides of them. Because we do not have a quality measure in our data base we use a brand specific constant (Q) to account for quality and other variations unique to the brand.
In the log-log versions of the equations the term
(1-e-*t(/E)t) represents the dynamics. We employ nonlinear least squares estimation methods (SYSNLIN OLS in SAS) to estimate the coefficients.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The statistical results of estimating the share, trial penetration, and repeat equations are shown in The "T" ratio values are shown in the parentheses. CINREP and REPPER refer to repeat wLoeels with cumulative repeaters as a percent of triers and average additional receats per repeater as the respective dependent measures. *Significant at the 10X level **Significant at the 5X Level ***Significant at the 1% level
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penalties are found in not only trial, but also in repeat behavior.
The share model asymptotic result confirms previous work (Urban et. al., 1986) itself. The data in part a of table 2 indicates that the rate of convergence to the asymptotic value is faster for entrant 3 than 2, 4 than 3, and 5 than 4. Later entrants approach their eventual share levels faster than early entrants all else being equal.
However, the asymptotic values for later entrants are lower (see In the trial model the exponential growth parameter psi is not significant so the null hypothesis of equal rates of growth to the asymptote for later entrants cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level.
The later entrants would not achieve trial penetration faster or slower than the earlier entrants, but they would achieve lower levels of asymptotic trial penetration if all else were equal. The trial penetration ratios are shown in table 3. In both repeat measures (cumulative repeat and repeats per repeater) the asymptotic and exponential growth parameters are significant at the ten percent level. This indicates that later entrants achieve lower asymptotic results but at a faster rate than early entrants. The pattern of growth is analogous to the share patterns and is shown in table 3 for twelve five week periods.
The elasticities of price, promotion, distribution, and advertising are all significant in the share equation with distribution and promotion being most responsive. The trial behavior is similar and the repeat models show low significance and mixed results.
Eighty nine percent of the dummy variables are significant at the ten percent level. An ANOVA analysis indicates significant differences across the brand constants (F (16,51) = 6.14 and 4 Note that the slope of the share ratios for later entrants is not higher for all periods relative to the earlier entrants, but they do grow at a faster rate in terms of proportion of their asymptote. significant at the 1% level), but no significant differences across the models (F (3,64) = 1.22 and not significant at' the 10% level).
The variables appear to capture meaningful brand specific effects, but the variation evident by inspection suggests that more than quality effects may be represented in the coefficients. 5
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH Asymptotic Order of Entry Penalties
The reported analysis indicates substantial order of entry penalties for market share. Table 4 gives the asymptotic estimates This suggests the estimates with dummies is conservative with respect to estimating the order of entry penalty. The statistical analysis of trial and repeat models indicates that the overall order of entry penalty is manifest in trial, first repeat, and subsequent repeat purchase behavior. Schmalensee (1982) modeled the source of order advantage based on the notion that once buyers use the first entrant's product, they will be unwilling to buy second entrant without a price concession because they are not certain the second product will work. This would suggest the order effect will be seen only on trial. A number of authors (Hauser and Shugan 1983 , Lane 1980 , and Prescott and Visscher 1977 suggest that if the early entrant takes the premier positioning in a space of heterogeneous preferences, the later entrants will have to settle for lower shares. This again suggests a trial penalty. It would not posit a repeat order effect because those consumers who try the product do it because the product does match their preferences and we therefore would expect to have normal repeat rates. Horsky and Mate (1988) find an order of entry advantage in the initial purchases of consumer durables due to goodwill generated by the larger stock of previous adopters possessed by first entrants.
Such a trial effect also could be true in packaged goods if diffusion phenomena are present.
Carpenter and Nakamoto's experimental work (1989) (Sujan 1985) that could affect trial and repeat behavior.
Other principles of generalized learning can produce similar phenomena (Alba and Hutchinson 1981, Marks and Olsen 1981, and  Meyer 1986). Kardes and Gurumurthy (1990) find in a behavioral experiment that pioneers benefit from more extensive recall of attribute information that is transferred to a persistent attitudinal advantage over later entrants. Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) argue that an order of entry advantage can accrue from the consumers' decision to include a brand in the their consideration sets. As more brands enter, the value of adding another brand decreases so earlier entrants are likely to be in more customers consideration sets. This advantage particularly would affect repeat purchase rates.
Our work provides evidence of order effects on both trial and repeat and many behavioral phenomena could explain this.
Behavioral experimentation is needed to isolate the determinants of these effects, the relative importance of each of the determinants, and the product situations wh3re they operate.
Rate of Approach to Asymptote
The results on the dynamics of the order effects are mixed.
The share equation identifies significant parameters that suggest later entrants approach lower levels of share but at a faster speed (see Table 2a and Figure one for the share dynamics and asymptotes based on the share parameter estimates and the price, promotion, distribution, and advertising equal to the pioneer). In the trial model, however, we do not find significant dynamic effects, while the cumulative first repeat and repeat per repeater models show significantly faster approaches to lower levels of repeat for later entrants.
We would have expected the trial dynamics to be significant because it is a large part of the overall share behavior of a new product. More empirical analysis is needed to clarify this question. It may be that the mixed result in the trial and repeat equations is due to the five week basis of the data for these estimations. Larger sample sizes and improved nonlinear estimation algorithms may be needed. Given the available evidence in this paper either there is no difference in the approach to the lower asymptotic share, trial, and repeat values or later entrants approach a lower asymptote at a faster rate.
Future Research
In addition to the need for the statistical and behavioral experimentation analyses indicated above, it would be desirable to extend the models to include the effects of entry on price, promotion, advertising and distribution. If later entry is significantly correlated to the level of these variables, it may indicate the order of entry penalty is not innate, but rather due to later entrants charging higher prices and having lower promotion, advertising, and distribution levels. Entry penalties may also be affected by the defensive reactions of pioneers rather than the basic market granted advantage. Although Robinson (1988) It would be interesting to test the share model on consumer durables, industrial products, and services to see if order of entry penalties are evident. Data may be difficult to collect, but ethical pharmaceuticals could provide a fertile empirical data base. Cross category differences in the order of entry effect must III be examined and an appropriate behavioral mechanism to explain these cross category differences must be studied. We are not able to undertake such a study in our data base because we do not have enough data within any one category to obtain convergence of the non-linear share or trial or repeat models. Much remains to be done in calibrating the size of the advantages of early entry, the determinants of such effects, and when they can be expected to occur.
